What this session covered
This session delivered a technical and operational analysis of GNSS jamming and spoofing in European airspace and the "GPS hangover" — the residual navigational uncertainty that can persist after an aircraft has left an affected area. It set out how interference patterns had evolved across the Baltic region and the Eastern Mediterranean between 2023 and 2025, how jamming and spoofing signals affected flight management systems, autopilots, and crew alerting depending on avionics generation, and the mechanism by which navigation systems can retain corrupted position or time data after the jamming signal is gone. The operational question it put to controllers and operators was practical: once GNSS integrity can no longer be assumed across whole regions, what does an ANSP rely on for separation assurance, and what can a crew do when the position on the display may already be wrong?
Why it mattered
By 2026, GNSS jamming and spoofing had hardened from occasional anomalies into a persistent operational hazard across European and Middle Eastern airspace, with the Baltic region and Eastern Mediterranean carrying the highest concentration of reported events. The exposure was structural: performance-based navigation, continuous descent approaches, U-space, and emerging urban air mobility all depend on reliable satellite positioning, so degraded GNSS does not stay contained to a single aircraft or procedure. EUROCONTROL had issued operational guidance and NOTAM practice for GNSS-degraded environments, and ANSPs and airlines were deploying alternative positioning, navigation and timing measures — but the carryover effect meant the risk window extended beyond the geographic edge of the interference, making a shared operational understanding of the phenomenon a safety priority rather than a research curiosity.
Key takeaways for ATM operators
- The "hangover" extends the risk window beyond the jamming zone. Navigation systems can keep acting on corrupted position or time data after the aircraft exits a GNSS-degraded area, so EUROCONTROL guidance on GNSS-degraded operations applied to crews and controllers even once the interference source was behind them.
- Geographic concentration shaped contingency planning. The Baltic region and Eastern Mediterranean recorded the highest density of reported jamming and spoofing between 2023 and 2025, which drove route-planning and contingency-procedure decisions in those areas.
- Mitigation in 2026 was procedural plus alternative PNT. The deployed response combined EUROCONTROL guidance and NOTAMs with alternative positioning, navigation and timing (APNT) approaches to reduce primary-navigation dependence on GNSS.
Frequently asked questions
Who presented this session at Airspace World 2026?
This session was delivered as part of the Safety, Security & Resilience in ATM theme at Airspace World 2026 in the Frequentis Theatre. Full speaker attribution for the session is being confirmed against the official programme.
When and where did this session take place at ASW 2026?
The session took place on Tuesday 26 May 2026 from 15:30 to 15:55 local Lisbon time (WEST, UTC+1) in the Frequentis Theatre at FIL — Feira Internacional de Lisboa, the Parque das Nações venue that hosted Airspace World 2026 from 26 to 28 May 2026.
What is the "GPS hangover" and why does it matter operationally?
The "GPS hangover" describes the period after an aircraft exits a GNSS-degraded environment during which its navigation systems may still display or act on corrupted position or time data. It matters because the residual uncertainty persists beyond the geographic edge of the interference, affecting crew awareness and the assumptions controllers can make about separation assurance.
Which areas of European airspace were most affected by GNSS interference?
The Baltic region and the Eastern Mediterranean saw the highest concentration of reported jamming and spoofing incidents between 2023 and 2025. The geographic and temporal patterns in those areas shaped route planning, operational planning, and contingency procedures for aircraft transiting them.
What mitigation was available to crews and controllers?
Mitigation combined procedural measures with technical ones: EUROCONTROL guidance and NOTAMs for operating in GNSS-degraded environments, crew procedures for recognising and managing degraded positioning, and alternative positioning, navigation and timing (APNT) approaches intended to reduce dependence on GNSS for primary navigation over the longer term.